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Abstract: Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based
key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange
protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyze Xie’s modified
protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement
protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols
from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master
key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with
the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and
its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model.
The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie Hellman
assumption.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Identity-based key exchanges have obvious advantages over
PKI based key exchanges, since the participants do not
Copyright c© 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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require public key certificates. The concept of identity-
based cryptography was introduced by Shamir (1984). In
the identity-based cryptography, users can choose an ar-
bitrary string, such as email address and IP number, as
their public key, and the corresponding private key is cre-
ated by binding the identity string with a master secret of
a trusted authority called Key Generation Centre (KGC).
Many identity-based key agreement schemes were based
on Shamir’s identity-based notion. Introduction of paring
cryptography by Sakai et al. (2000) opened up an entirely
new field for identity-based cryptography. Since then,
many novel identity-based key agrement protocols from
pairings have been introduced (Smart (2002); Shim (2003);
Chen et al. (2007); McCullagh and Barreto (2005); Xie
(2005); Boyd and Choo (2005); Chow and Choo (2007)).
Key agreement protocols should satisfy some basic secu-
rity properties, for example, known-key security, forward
security, unknown-key share resilience, key-compromise
impersonate resilience and no key control. The known se-
curity models usually cover all of the above security at-
tributes except the forward security.
In a key agreement protocol, two or more participants
can generate a shared session key by making use of their
long-term keys and ephemeral messages exchanged over an
open network. The shared secret session key is then used
for secure communication. Forward secrecy (fs) is one of
the most important attributes of the authenticated key
agreement protocol. Under this assumption, disclosure of
a long-term private key(s) does not affect the secrecy of
previous session keys established by honest participants.
It can be considered as three cases from different levels:
• Partial forward secrecy (s-fs): Compromising some
but not all of the entities’ long-term keys does not
disclose previously established session keys;
• Perfect forward secrecy (d-fs): Compromising all en-
tities’ long-term keys does not disclose previously es-
tablished session keys;
• Master key forward secrecy (m-fs): Compromising
long-term key of the key generation center does not
affect the secrecy of the previously session keys. This
is a particular property in the identity-based systems
and it implies perfect forward secrecy.
Most of the identity-based key agreement protocols satisfy
the partial forward secrecy, however, only few of them sat-
isfy the perfect forward secrecy and the master key forward
secrecy.
McCullagh and Barreto (2005) presented two identity-
based authenticated key agreement protocols (MB proto-
cols for short) in 2005: with key escrow and without key
escrow (Here we only focus on the one without key escrow
which implies the master key forward secrecy). Their pro-
tocols were the first ones that adopt key extraction algo-
rithm introduced by Sakai and Kasahara (2003), where the
private key of the user is obtained by multiplication of the
inverse of the sum of the master key and a random value
from a cyclic group. These protocols are more efficient
compared to those based on the key extraction algorithm,
where the private key of the user is a product of the mas-
ter key and a point in the group of an elliptic curve Sakai
et al. (2000). There are quite a few schemes (Cheng et al.
(2004); Chen et al. (2007); Xie (2004); Choo (2005)) that
are based on MB protocols. The original security of MB
protocols are reduced to the Bilinear Inverse Diffie Hell-
mam (BIDH) problem in a weaker security model where
the reveal query is disallowed in random oracle. There-
fore, Cheng and Chen (2007) attempted to improve the
proof of the MB protocols by introducing a new security
assumption called k-Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption
(k-BCAA1), which is the variant of k-Bilinear Inverse Diffie
Hellmam (k-BIDH) assumption, and reducing the security
of MB protocols to the Gap k-Bilinear Collision Attack As-
sumption (Gap-k-BCAA1) assumption. After that, Chen
et al. (2007) introduced a build-in function to reduce the
security of an enhanced MB protocol to a computational
assumption. The security model they used has no limita-
tion to the reveal query.
McCullagh and Barreto’s first protocols (MB-1) are vul-
nerable to key compromise impersonation attack according
to Xie (2004). They later provided a variant of the pro-
tocols (MB-2) to eliminate this weakness. Unfortunately,
the perfect forward secrecy and the master key forward
secrecy are lost.
In order to improve MB-1 to resist the key compromise
impersonation attack, Xie (2005) introduced a signature
to the protocol. However, it does not accommodate the
master key forward secrecy. We observe that signature is
undesirable to fix MB-1 protocol since the cost of signa-
ture is expensive, and most importantly, master key for-
ward secrecy cannot be achieved using a signature. In the
case that the attacker knows the master key, then he can
compute all users’ private keys which are used to produce
the signatures, thus obtain some useful information which
could lead to the final session secrets. We will utilize Xie’s
protocol to explain this case. Therefore, in order to im-
prove MB protocols to satisfy all basic security properties,
we will enhance MB-2 so that it can catch the master key
forward secrecy.
A typical approach to improve the MB-2 protocol so that
it can capture the master key forward secrecy is to add the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key computation into the session key,
using the key extraction algorithm of Sakai et al. (2000), as
proposed in Chen and Kudla (2003); Yuan and Li (2005).
However, the key tokens provided by the participants in
the MB-2 protocol are computed with different bases. We
observe that integrating the ephemeral secret key and a
public parameter which is accessible to both parties can
subsequently add an extra DH key exchange in the key
tokens. This operation allows us to compute the DH key
and capture forward secrecy, including the perfect forward
secrecy and the master key forward secrecy.
Our contributions. Using the above strategy, in this pa-
per we propose two improved protocols from MB-2. In
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the first protocol, we choose an extra random value to
construct the DH key to capture the master key forward
secrecy. This protocol can achieve all basic security re-
quirements. The security is reduced to a gap assumption.
However, a powerful adversary can mount the weak man-
in-the-middle attack on this protocol if they have the abil-
ity to obtain some session secrets (that is why we call it
“weak man-in-the-middle attack”). Therefore we give an-
other enhanced protocol which can resist this kind of at-
tack by introducing a hash function. Another extra fruit
of bringing in this hash function is that the security of the
protocol is reduced to the computational assumption. We
outline our contributions as follows.
1. We analyze Xie’s protocol to explain why signature
is undesirable to fix MB-1 and fails to capture the
master key forward secrecy.
2. We present two protocols by improving the MB-2 pro-
tocol so that they can capture all of the basic security
properties, especially the master key forward secrecy.
Our first protocol has the comparable computational
performance to the original MB protocol in terms of
pairing computation, while our second protocol has
the stronger security.
3. We reduce the security of the first protocol to a gap
assumption and the security of the second protocol to
the computational assumption by introducing a hash
function which is used to resist the weak man-in-the-
middle attack. We prove the master key forward se-
crecy of the second protocol in the random oracle, by
assuming the computational Diffie Hellman assump-
tion is hard.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we describe the preliminaries including bilinear pairing
and the security model. In Section 3, we analyze Xie’s pro-
tocol to explain why signature cannot capture the master
key forward security in an identity-based key agreement
protocols. In Section 4, we present our first protocol and
provide a detailed discussion. In Section 5, we introduce
the improved protocol which can resist the weak man-in-
the-middle attack and give a comparison with other re-
lated protocols in terms of security properties, the cost of
computation and communication. In Section 6, we present
two theorems to demonstrate that our schemes are seman-
tically secure and possess the master key forward secrecy.
In Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic concepts, including
the pairing primitives, assumptions and the security model
of a key exchange protocol with master key forward se-
crecy.
2.1 Bilinear Pairing and Security Assumptions
Most of the known authenticated key exchange protocols
which are more widely used in practice are based on bi-
linear pairings. Here we briefly review some basic facts
of pairings. The notations will be used in the following
sections.
Definition 1. Let G1 is an additive group of prime order
q and GT a multiplicative group of the same order. Let
P1 denote a generator of G1. An admissible pairing is a
bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GT which has the following
properties:
1. Bilinear: given Q, R ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have
ê(aQ, bR) = ê(Q,R)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: ê(P1, P1) 6= 1GT .
3. Computable: ê is efficiently computable.
Remark 1. Usually, the map ê can be derived from either
the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite
field. In practice, the groups, pairings and other parame-
ters should be selected carefully for security and efficiency.
Refer Chen et al. (2007) for more details.
Remark 2. There are two kinds of bilinear pairings: sym-
metric pairing and asymmetric pairing. If the points in the
pairing come from different groups, say (Q,R) ∈ G1 ×G2
where G2 is also an additive group of prime order q and P2
is a generator of G2, then we say this pairing is an asym-
metric pairing. Correspondingly, we have ê(P1, P2) 6= 1GT .
Usually, there exists an efficient algorithm ψ which maps
a point in G2 to a point in G1. In this paper, both of the
two schemes are based on asymmetric pairing.
In the following, we describe some assumptions which
are related to the security of our schemes.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption: For
a, b ∈R Z∗q and some values of i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}, given (aPi,
bPj), computing abPk is hard.
Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (k-BCAA1 Cheng
and Chen (2007)): For an integer k, and x ∈R Z∗q , P2 ∈ G2,
P1 = ψ(P2), ê : G1 ×G2 → GT , given
(P1, P2, xP2, h0, (h1,
1
h1 + x
P2), · · · , (hk,
1
hk + x
P2)),
where hi ∈R Z∗q and are different from each other for 0 ≤
i ≤ k, computing ê(P1, P2)
1
x+h0 is hard.
Gap Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (k-GBCAA1
Cheng and Chen (2007)): For an integer k, and x ∈R Z∗q ,
P2 ∈ G2, P1 = ψ(P2) ∈ G1, ê : G1 ×G2 → GT , given
(P1, P2, xP2, h0, (h1,
1
h1 + x
P2), · · · , (hk,
1
hk + x
P2)),
where hi ∈R Z∗q and are different from each other for
0 ≤ i ≤ k, and the access to a decision BIDH oracle
(DBIDH) which given (P1, P2, aP1, bP2, ê(P1, P2)r) return
1 if ê(P1, P2)r = ê(P1, P2)
b
a , else return 0, computing
ê(P1, P2)
1
x+h0 is hard.
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2.2 Security Models
In this paper, we adopt the security model proposed by
Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and extended to public key
construction by Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) to test the se-
curity strength of a protocol.
The model includes a set of parties and each party in-
volved in a session is modeled by an oracle. An oracle
Πsi,j denotes an instance of a party i involved with a part-
ner party j in a session s where the instance of the party
j is Πtj,i for some t. These parties can not communicate
directly; instead they only communicate with each other
via an adversary. An adversary can access the oracle by
issuing some specified queries as follows.
Send(Πsi,j , m): This query models an active attack.
Πsi,j executes the protocol and responds with an out-
going message x or a decision to indicate accepting or
rejecting the session. If the oracle Πsi,j does not exist,
it will be created. Note that if m = λ, then the oracle
is generated as an initiator; otherwise as a responder.
Reveal(Πsi,j ): Π
s
i,j returns the session key as its re-
sponse if the oracle accepts. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Such an oracle is called opened.
Corrupt(i): The party i responds with its private key.
Test(Πsi,j): At some point, the adversary can make a
Test query to a fresh oracle Πsi,j . Π
s
i,j , as a challenger,
randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the
real agreed session key, if b = 0; otherwise it returns
a random sample generated according to the distribu-
tion of the session key.
The security of a protocol is defined using the two-phases
game G played between a malicious adversary C and a col-
lection of oracles. At the first stage, C is able to send
the above first three oracle queries at will. Then, at some
point, C will choose a fresh session Πsi,j on which to be
tested and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associ-
ated with the test session. After this point, the adversary
can continue querying the oracles but can not reveal the
test oracle or its partner, and cannot corrupt the entity j.
Eventually, C terminates the game simulation and outputs
a bit b′ for b. we say C wins if the adversary guesses the
correct b.
Define the advantage of C as:
AdvC(k) = | 2 Pr[b′ = b]− 1 |,
where k is a security parameter. The fresh oracle in the
game is defined as follows.
Definition 2. (Fresh oracle Cheng et al. (2004)) An or-
acle Πsi,j is called fresh if (1) Π
s
i,j has accepted; (2) Π
s
i,j
is unopened; (3) j 6= i is not corrupted; (4) there is no
opened oracle Πtj,i, which has had a matching conversation
to Πsi,j.
In this work, we use the concatenation of the messages
in a session to define the session ID, thus to define the
matching conversation, i.e., two oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i have
a matching conversation to each other if both of them have
the same session ID.
Now we are ready to give the definition of a secure au-
thenticated key agreement protocol.
Definition 3. Protocol Π is a secure authenticated key
agreement protocol, if:
• In the presence of the benign adversary (who faithfully
relays messages between parties), on Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i,
both oracles always accept holding the same session
key and this key is distributed uniformly at random
on session key space;
• For every probability polynomial time(PPT) adversary
C, AdvC(k) is negligible.
As mentioned in Chen et al. (2007), if a protocol is
proved to be secure with respect to the above definition,
then it achieves implicit mutual key authentication and
the basic security properties, i.e., known session key se-
curity, key-compromise impersonation resilience and un-
known key-share resilience. However, this security model
does not cover forward secrecy property. Here, we adopt
the definition of Chen et al. (2007) to define the master
key forward secrecy as follows:
Definition 4. A protocol is said to have master key for-
ward secrecy if any PPT adversary wins the game with
negligible advantage when it chooses an unopened chal-
lenger Πsi,j which has a matching conversation to another
unopened Πtj,i and both oracles accepted and the master key
is disclosed. The disclosure of the master key may happen
at any time of the game.
As pointed out by Chen et al. (2007), the definition
above is a weaker notion since the adversary is required
to be benign in the test session and with the knowledge
of the master key to distinguish the session key from a
random sample to win the game.
Remark 3. Since the master key forward secrecy implies
perfect forward secrecy, we can say a protocol also has per-
fect forward secrecy if we can prove that the protocol has
master key forward secrecy.
3 Revisit Xie’s Repair on MB-1
In this section, Xie (2005) is analyzed to explain why signa-
ture cannot be used in identity-based key agreement pro-
tocols to achieve the master key forward secrecy. Although
this protocol has not been published in a refereed confer-
ence or journal, our analysis will show the necessity of our
protocols.
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3.1 Xie’s Fix with Signature
In Xie (2005), the MB-1 protocol was modified with a sig-
nature from the idea of Reddy and Nalla (2002). Suppose
two principals A and B are to agree on a session key. The
scheme consists of three algorithms: Setup, Extract and
Key Agreement. The first two are the same as those in the
MB-1 protocol, so the symbols here follow those in the MB-
1 protocol. The private key is dIdent = 1s+H1(IDIdent)P2
where s is the master key of the KGC, Ident = {A,B}
and H1 is a hash function from the user identity space
to Z∗q . As MB-1 protocol, it is important that the dis-
crete logarithm between ψ(P1) and P2 is unknown. Let
QIdent = (s + H1(IDIdent))P1, the Key Agreement stage
is as follows.
To establish a shared session key, A and B respectively
and randomly chooses x and y from Z∗q as their respective
ephemeral key, and computes the corresponding ephemeral
public keys AKA = xQB , SA = H2(AKA)dA + xdA and
BKA = yQA, SB = H2(BKA)dB +ydB , where H2 is a hash
function from G1 to Z∗q . They then exchange (AKA, SA)
and (BKA, SB) as described in Figure 1.
After the message exchange, A and B conduct the fol-
lowing tasks:
• Having received (BKA, SB), A verifies
ê(QB , SB) = ê(H2(BKA)P1, P2) · ê(BKA, dA).
If the equation holds, then A computes
KAB = ê(BKA, dA)x.
• B verifies
ê(QA, SA) = ê(H2(AKA)P1, P2) · ê(AKA, dB).
If the equation holds, then B computes
KBA = ê(AKA, dB)y.
As the result of executing the protocol, A and B can com-
pute the common session secret key as ê(P1, P2)xy.
3.2 Analysis
It was claimed that the repaired protocol resists the key-
compromise impersonate attack. In the following, we show
how an adversary C who knows the master key computes
the final session secret key using the signature in the ab-
sence of a computable group isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1
mapping P2 to P1.
• C computes
xP1 = (s+H1(IDB))−1 ·AKA
and
yP1 = (s+H1(IDA))−1 ·BKA.
• C computes dA and dB , then computes
xP2 = (s+H1(IDA)) · (SA −H2(AKA)dA)
and
yP2 = (s+H1(IDB)) · (SB −H2(BKA)dB).
• C computes
K = ê(xP1, yP2) = ê(P1, P2)xy
or computes
K = ê(yP1, xP2) = ê(P1, P2)xy.
Remark 4. In the original MB-1 protocol without key es-
crow, the adversary C can compute xP1 and yP1 as in the
step 1 while can not compute xP2 and yP2. Although he
can compute ê(P1, P2)x and ê(P1, P2)y, he can not com-
pute ê(P1, P2)xy due to the hardness of the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption. However, in the fixed protocol,
C can compute the useful information, i.e., xP2 and yP2,
from the signature. Therefore, he can compute the final
session secret key.
Remark 5. Although the modified protocol can resist the
key-compromise impersonate attack, it does not capture the
master key forward secrecy since the adversary can obtain
some useful information from the signature, and the com-
putational cost is more expensive than the original one be-
cause of the signature.
4 Our First Protocol with Master Key Forward Security
In this section, we present our improved MB protocol.
4.1 The Scheme
As all other identity-based systems, we assume the exis-
tence of a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) that is
responsible for the creation and secure distribution of users
private keys.
Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as its
input and conducts the following steps:
• Generate a prime q, and a bilinear pairing ê : G1 ×
G2 → GT , where G1, G2 and GT are all cycle
subgroups of order q. Then, choose two generators
P1 ∈ G∗1 and P2 ∈ G∗2 randomly so that P1 = ψ(P2).
• Choose a value s ∈ Z∗q and compute Ppub = sP1.
• Choose two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗
→ Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for some n.
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The KGC publics params= 〈q,G1,G2,GT , ê,P1, P2,
ψ, Ppub, H1, H2〉 as the system parameters, and keeps s as
his own secret master key. The parameters are distributed
to the users of the system through a secure authenticated
channel.
Extract: The KGC takes as input params, master key,
and an arbitrary IDIdent ∈ {0, 1}∗, generates the private
key dIdent = 1s+H1(IDIdent)P2 and sends it to the user.
Suppose two participants A and B intend to agree on
a session key. Let QIdent = (s + H1(IDIdent))P1 where
Ident = {A,B}.
Key Agreement: To establish a shared session key, A
and B respectively choose x1, x2 and y1, y2 from Z∗q as their
respective ephemeral key, and computes the corresponding
ephemeral public keys T11 = x1QB , T12 = x2P2 and T21 =
y1QA, T22 = y2P2. They then exchange T1 = T11‖T12 and
T2 = T21‖T22 as described in Figure 2.
After the message exchange,
• A computes the shared secrets
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
and
KAB2 = x2 · T22.
• B computes
KBA1 = ê(T11, dB) · ê(P1, P2)y1
and
KBA2 = y2 · T12.
Protocol Correctness: we can easily verify the correct-
ness:
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(y1QA, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(P1, P2)y1 · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(P1, P2)x1+y1 ,
KAB2 = x2 · T22
= x2y2P2.
Similarly, we can obtain KBA1 = ê(P1, P2)
x1+y1 and
KBA2 = x2y2P2. Thus, the two secret keys computed by A
and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully established
the shared key K1 = KAB1 = KBA1 and K2 = KAB2 =
KBA2 after running an instance of the protocol. The final
shared session key is then sk = H2(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖K1‖K2),
where H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
4.2 Discussion
In this protocol, we utilize an asymmetric pairing to com-
pute the first session secret, and add a DH exchange key to
capture the master key forward security. It is known that
the computational cost on asymmetric pairing is efficient
than that of the symmetric pairing.
We can easily observe the master key forward security in
our protocol. Given a malicious adversary C who owns the
master key s, C can compute x1P1 = T11 ·(s+H1(IDB))−1
and y1P1 = T21 · (s + H1(IDA))−1. He can compute
ê(P1, P2)x1+y1 = ê(x1P1, P2) · ê(y1P1, P2). Although C
knows x2P2 and y2P2, he can not compute the second
session secret x2y2P2 due to the hardness of the compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Therefore, C can not
obtain the final shared session secret key.
In our scheme, we add a Diffie-Hellman exchange key to
capture the master key forward security. It is well known
that the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is
vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack due to its lack
of mutual authentication. In our above scheme, there ex-
ists the similar but less serious problem. More precisely,
each message flow is consisted of two messages. The first
message has some property of implicit authentication since
it bands a random ephemeral private key with a public key
of the party with whom the sender intends to communi-
cate. Only the party who has the corresponding private
key can obtain the ephemeral private key and use it to
compute the session secret. However, there is no guarantee
in the second message. Therefore, if a malicious adversary
C has some ability to obtain the first session secret, then
he can mount the man-in-the-middle attack successfully.
• C blocks the message flows T1 = x1QB‖x2P2 and T2 =
y1QA‖y2P2 between two users, and selects a random
value z and computes zP2, then sends x1QB and zP2
to B and y1QA and zP2 to A.
• C manages to obtain the first session secret by some
means. This is possible if the attacker is powerful, for
example, he is a powerful server.
• C computes the second session secret with A and B as
x2zP2 and y2zP2, respectively.
Thus, the session secrets between A and C are KAC,1 and
KAC,2 = x2zP2, and the session secrets between B and C
are KBC1 and KBC2 = y2zP2. Note that KAC1 = KBC1 =
KAB1 . Therefore, at the end of the execution, A and B
thought they have established a shared secret key, while
actually, they have shared the different keys with C. Thus,
if A wants to send a ciphertext which is encrypted by the
established shared session key to B, then B can not obtain
the right plaintext. However, C can read the message using
this shared session key. A and B will not aware of this.
The other difference between this scheme and the MB-2
is that in our scheme, each user chooses two random values
as the ephemeral private keys so that we can reduce the se-
curity of the scheme to the gap computational assumption.
If we use one random value to construct the messages, we
find it is hard to deal with the Send query perfectly.
5 Our Second Scheme with Stronger Security
To strengthen the security of our first protocol, we manage
to bind the two messages together so that the powerful
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adversary can not modify the second message.
5.1 The Scheme
The scheme of Setup and Extract are the same as the
first protocol except thet we need three cryptographic
hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : G2 → G1 and
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for some n. We introduce another
message in the Key Agreement stage to prevent the adver-
sary from modifying message sent by the users.
Key Agreement: To establish a shared session key, A
and B respectively chooses x1, x2 and y1, y2 from Z∗q
as their ephemeral key, and computes the correspond-
ing ephemeral public keys T11 = x1QB , T12 = x2P2,
T13 = x1H2(x2P2) and T21 = y1QA, T22 = y2P2 and T23 =
y1H2(y2P2). They then exchange T1 = (T11, T12, T13) and
T2 = (T21, T22, T23) as described in Figure 3.
After the message exchange,
• A and B check if the equation
ê(T21, H2(T22)) = ê(QA, T23)
and
ê(T11, H2(T12)) = ê(QB , T13)
hold.
If not, abort the session.
• A computes the shared secrets
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
and
KAB2 = x2 · T22.
• B computes the shared secrets
KBA1 = ê(T11, dB) · ê(P1, P2)y1
and
KBA2 = y2 · T12.
Protocol Correctness: we can easily verify the following
equations:
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(y1QA, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(P1, P2)y1 · ê(P1, P2)x1
= ê(P1, P2)x1+y1 ,
KAB2 = x2 · T22
= x2 · (y2P2)
= x2y2P2.
Similarly, we can obtain KBA1 = ê(P1, P2)
x1+y1 and
KBA2 = x2y2P2. Thus, two secret keys computed by
A and B are equal, i.e., A and B have successfully es-
tablished the shared secrets K1 = KAB1 = KBA1 and
K2 = KAB2 = KBA2 after running an instance of the
protocol. The final shared secret session key is then sk =
H3(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖K1‖K2), where H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
5.2 Discussion
We explain why we construct x1H2(x2P2) as user A’s third
message and how this message is used to resist the weak
man-in-the middle attack on the first protocol.
The main purpose of introducing the third message is
to make sure that the second message was not modified
during the protocol. There are two methods which are
usually used to resist the man-in-the-middle attack: one
is based on the hash function and the other relies on a
signature. We have showed that signature is undesirable
for an identity-based key agreement protocol with master
key forward secrecy in Section 3. We now utilize the hash
function value H2(x2P2) to construct the third message.
However, a malicious adversary would create a new mes-
sage pair (zP2, H2(zP2)) by himself. Therefore, this hash
value should be bound with some secret value which can-
not be computed by the adversary. Here we choose the
secret value x1 since an adversary can not compute x1 or
x1P1 from x1QB ; thus he can not create forge a message
pair. The reason we do not choose x2 is that the adversary
can still forge a message pair (zP2, zH2(zP2)) which passes
the check without being noticed! Moreover, to our surprise,
the extra part can not only resist weak man-in-the-middle
attack, but also can be used to construct a build-in func-
tion which helps the simulator to reduce the security of the
protocol to a computational assumption instead of a gap
assumption.
In the following, we explain how the extra message is
used to resist the above attack. As a matter of fact, in the
message flow T1 = (T11, T12, T13), one part or two parts of
them cannot be modified without the other part(s) unmod-
ified. So the third part and the check equations guarantee
the integrity of the message.
• C intercepts the message flows T1 =
(x1QB , x2P2, x1H2(x2P2)) and T2 = (y1QA,
y2P2, y1H2(y2P2)) between the two users, and
selects a random value z and computes zP2, then
sends (x1QB , zP2, T ′13) to B, where T
′
13 6= x1H2(zP2)
since C does not know x1 and sends (y1QA, zP2, T ′23)
to A, where T ′23 6= y1H2(zP2).
• A and B check if the equations
ê(T21, H2(T22)) = ê(QA, T23)
and
ê(T11, H2(T12)) = ê(QB , T13)
hold or not.
It is easy to verify that both of the equations do not
hold. According to the protocol specification, the pro-
tocol is aborted.
5.3 Efficiency Analysis and Comparison
We compare our schemes with the original MB protocol
and all of its variants, in terms of the security properties,
security reduction and computation cost. The comparison
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is outlined in Table 1 where the second column lists all
the basic security attributes: known-key secrecy (k-ks),
forward secrecy (fs), key compromise impersonate (kci),
and unknown-key share (uks). We use X to indicate that
the property is proved to be satisfied and × otherwise, and
use - to denote that there is no any acceptable proof. In the
last column, P denotes Pairing, M denotes multiplication
in Gi, where i = {1, 2} and E denotes exponentiation in
GT .
According to Table 1, every scheme has some weakness,
except our two schemes which satisfies all basic security
properties. In security reduction, only the security of e-
MB and our second scheme is reduced to a computational
assumption.
Considering the computational cost, all of the schemes
need only one pairing to compute the final session secret.
The e-MB scheme and our second scheme need two more
pairings to check the equation for each user. Note that
this equation actually is the build-in function which helps
the simulator to compute the session secret and reduce the
security to the computational assumption. Although our
second scheme needs an additional hash function, the com-
putational cost of this kind of hash function is negligible.
6 Security analysis
The semantic security of the first scheme can be reduced
to the gap assumption in a sightly different model from the
model in this paper. The semantic security of the second
scheme can be reduced to the computational assumption.
The master key forward secrecy of both schemes can be
reduced to the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Due to the similarity in the reductions, we only present
the detailed proof of the second scheme.
The key idea for the proof is as follows. We try to con-
struct an algorithm B using the adversary A that attacks
the second scheme to solve a (q1-1)-BCAA1 problem with
non-negligible probability. More precisely, when A makes
the different queries according to the security model in Sec-
tion 2.2, B should simulate different oracles and respond
to A without being noticed the difference between the sim-
ulation and the real world. After the interaction between
A and B, B should give a solution to the (q1-1)-BCAA1
problem with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 1. If H1, H2 and H3 are random oracles and the
(q1-1)-BCAA1 assumption holds, then our second scheme
is a secure key agreement protocol. In particular, suppose
A is an adversary that attacks the second scheme in the
random oracle model with non-negligible probability n(k)
and makes at most q1, q3 queries to H1 and H3, respec-
tively, and creates at most qo oracles. Then there exists
an algorithm B to solve the (q1-1)-BCAA1 problem with
advantage
Adv
(q1−1)−BCAA1
B (k) ≥
1
q1 · q3 · q0
n(k).
Proof: Our proof follows the same method used in Chen
et al. (2007). Session ID is defined as a concatenation of
T1 ‖ T2. We focus on how to construct an algorithm B
using the adversary A to solve a (q1-1)-BCAA1 problem
with non-negligible probability.
Given an instance of the (q1-1)-BCAA1 problem
〈G1,G2,GT , ê, q, ψ, (P1, P2, sP2, h0,
(h1,
1
h1 + s
P2), · · · , (hq1−1,
1
hq1−1 + s
P2))〉,
where hi ∈R Z∗q for 0 ≤ i ≤ q1 − 1, ê is a bi-
linear pairing: ê : G1 × G2 → GT , the algorithm
B’s task is computing ê(P1, P2)
1
h0+s . B simulates the
Setup algorithm by firstly computing Ppub = ψ(sP2) =
sP1 ∈ G∗1 where s is the master key which it does
not know, and then sending the system parameters
(G1,G2,GT , ê, q, ψ, P1, P2, Ppub, H1, H2, H3) to A. The
hash functions H1, H2 and H3 are random oracles con-
trolled by B.
Algorithm B randomly chooses I ∈R {1, · · · q1} and
J ∈R {1, · · · , q0} and begins its simulation. Here we
should note that the notation Πsi,j is the s-th oracle among
all the created oracles. Algorithm B answers the queries
which are asked by adversary A in arbitrary order as fol-
lows.
H1(IDi) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty
list H list1 with entries of the form (IDi, hi, di). When A
queries the oracle H1 at a point IDi, B responds to the
query in the follows way:
If IDi already appears on the H list1 in a tuple
(IDi, hi, di), then B responds with H1(IDi) = hi.
Otherwise, if IDi is the I-th unique identifier query,
then B stores (IDi, h0,⊥) into the tuple list and re-
sponds with H1(IDi) = h0.
Otherwise, B randomly selects hi(i > 0) from the (q1-
1)-BCAA1 instance which has not been chosen by B
and inserts (IDi, hi, 1hi+sP2) into the tuple list. B
responds with H1(IDi) = hi.
H2(Si) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty
list H list2 with entries of the form (St,mt, Rt, wt). B re-
sponds to the query in the follows way:
• If a tuple (Si,mi, Ri, wi) has already appeared on the
H list2 , then B responds with Ri.
• Otherwise, B randomly selects mi (i > 0) ∈R Z∗q
and inserts (Si,mi,miP1,⊥) into the tuple list. B
responds with miP1.
H3(IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1,K
t
2) queries: B maintains an
initially empty list H list3 with entries of the form
(IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1,K
t
2, ζ
t) which is indexed by
(IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1,K
t
2). B responds to the query
in the following way.
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• If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1,Kt2) is on
the list, then B responds with ζt.
• Otherwise, B chooses a random string ζt ∈ {0, 1}n
and inserts a new tuple (IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j , K
t
1,K
t
2, ζ
t)
into the list H list3 and returns ζ
t.
Corrupt(IDi): B goes through list H list1 . If IDi is not on
the list, B queries H1(IDi). B checks the value of di: if
di 6=⊥, then B responds with di; otherwise, B aborts the
game (Event 1).
Send(Πti,j , (M1,M2,M3)): B maintains a list for each ora-
cle of the form (Πti,j , tran
t
i,j ,r
t
ij,1,r
t
ij,2, K
t
ij,1,SK
t
i,j) where
tranti,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; r
t
ij,1, r
t
ij,2 are
the random integers used by the oracle to generate the
messages; Kti,j and SK
t
i,j are set ⊥ initially. This list is
updated in other queries as well. B proceeds in the follow-
ing way:
• Query Qi = H1(IDi)P1 +sP1, Qj = H1(IDj)P1 +sP1
and R = H2(M2).
• B looks through the list H list1 . If IDi is not on the list,
B queries H1(IDi). After that, B checks the value of
t.
• If t = J , B checks the value of dj and gives the differ-
ent response depending on it as below.
– If dj 6=⊥, B aborts the game (Event 2).
– Otherwise,
∗ If (M1,M2,M3) is not the last message, ran-
domly sample x ∈ Z∗q such that xP1 is not
shown on the list of H list2 as some St, and
then randomly sample wt ∈ Z∗q and insert
the tuple (xP1,⊥, wt · (h0 + s)P1, wt) into
H list2 .
∗ If (M1,M2,M3) = λ, compute Ti1 =
xP1 = rQj , Ti2 = yP2 and Ti3 =
rH2(Ti2) = xh0+s · (wt · (h0 + s)P1) =
xwtP1, where r = xh0+s which is unknown
to the simulator. Obviously the equation
ê(Ti1, H2(Ti2)) = ê(Qj , Ti3) holds. Then re-
spond with (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3).
∗ If (M1,M2,M3) is the first message of the
session, then check if ê(M1, R) = ê(Qi,M3)
holds or not. If so, compute Ti1 = xP1 =
rQj , Ti2 = yP2 and Ti3 = rH2(Ti2) =
x
h0+s
· (wt · (h0 + s)P1) = xwtP1, where
r = xh0+s is unknown to the simulator. Then
respond with (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3) and accept the
session. Otherwise, reject the session.
∗ If (M1,M2,M3) is the last message of the
session, then check if ê(M1, R) = ê(Qi,M3)
holds or not. If so, do nothing but accept
the session. Otherwise, reject the session.
• If t 6= J , B proceeds the protocol as follows.
– If (M1,M2,M3) is not the second message on the
transcript,
∗ If di 6= ⊥, randomly sample rtij,1 ∈ Z∗q and
rtij,2 ∈ Z∗q .
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample rtij,1 ∈ Z∗q and
rtij,2 ∈ Z∗q , compute rtij,1Qi, rtij,2P2 so that
they have not been shown on H list3 as a part
of some Ti if Πti,j is the initiator or Tj oth-
erwise.
– If (M1,M2,M3) = λ, compute Ti1 = rtij,1Qj ,
Ti2 = rtij,2P2 and Ti3 = r
t
ij,1H2(Ti2), Then re-
spond with (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3).
– Otherwise, check if the equation ê(M1, R) =
ê(Qi,M3). If the equation does not hold, reject
the session. Otherwise,
∗ If Tj = (M1,M2,M3) is the first message of
the session, compute Ti1 = rtij,1Qj , Ti2 =
rtij,2P2 and Ti3 = r
t
ij,1H2(Ti2), then respond
with Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3). Compute Kti,j as
below and accept the session. If di 6= ⊥,
compute
Ktij,1 = ê(M1, di) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1
and
Ktij,2 = r
t
ij,2 ·M2
where M1, M2 are a part of the incoming
messages and rtij,1, r
t
ij,2 are selected ran-
domly by oracle Πti,j . If di = ⊥, compute
Ktij,1 = ê(M1, di) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1
= ê(M1,
1
s+ h0
P2) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1 ,
and
Ktij,2 = r
t
ij,2 ·M2
where M1, M2 are the incoming messages
and rtij,1, r
t
ij,2 are selected randomly by ora-
cle Πti,j .
Since 1s+h0 is unknown to the simulator, it
checks the value of the first received message
M1, and does as follows:
If M1 6= xP1, then by using ê(M1, 1s+h0P2) =
ê(P1, 1mtM3) followed from the equation
ê(M1, R) = ê(Qi,M3), where H2(M2) =
R = mtP2(find mt in the H list2 ), compute
Kti,j = ê(P1,
1
mt
M3) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1
If M1 = xP1, do nothing.
∗ If Ktij,1 and Ktij,2 are computed, then set
SKti,j = H3(IDi, IDj , Ti, Tj ,K
t
ij,1,K
t
ij,2)
if party i is the initiator, or SKti,j =
H3(IDj , IDi, Tj , Ti,Ktij,1,K
t
ij,2) otherwise.
If Ktij,1 and K
t
ij,1 are not computed, then
randomly sample SKti,j .
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Reveal(Πti,j): B answers the queries as follows:
• If oracle Πti,j has not accepted, then respond with ⊥.
• If t = J or if the J-th oracle has been generated as
ΠJa,b and IDa = IDj , IDb = IDi and two oracles have
the same session ID, then abort the game (Event 3).
• Return SKti,j .
Test(Πti,j): If t 6= J or (t = J but) there is an oracle
Πsj,i which has the same session ID as Π
t
i,j that has been
revealed, B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise, B re-
sponds to A a random number ζ ∈ {0, 1}n.
After A finishes the queries, it returns its guess. Then
B proceeds with the following steps:
• Compute D = ê(M1, di), where M1 is the first part
of the received messages, di is found from H list1 corre-
sponding to IDi of ΠJi,j . Note that
KJi,j = ê(M1, di) · ê(P1, P2)
x
h0+s
= D · (ê(P1, P2)
1
h0+s )x.
• B randomly samples Kl,1 from the H list3 , and returns
(Kl,1/D)
1
x as the response to the (q1-1)-BCAA1 chal-
lenge.
Claim 1. During the simulation, the probability that B did
not abort the game is non-negligible.
Proof: We now evaluate the probability that B did not
abort during the game, i.e., Events 1 - 4 did not happen. B
aborts the game only when at least one of following events
happens:
1. Event 1, denoted as F1: A corrupted party i whose
private key is represented by ⊥, i.e., A made a query
to party i to get its private key if it chose Πuj,i as
the fresh oracle, which is disallowed according to the
definition of the fresh oracle;
2. Event 2, denoted as F2: A can not impersonate party
i whose private key is represented by ⊥ in the u-th
session;
3. Event 3, denoted as F3: A revealed the J-th oracle
or its partner oracle, which is against the definition of
the fresh oracle,
4. Event 4, denoted as F4: A did not choose the J-th
oracle as the challenge fresh oracle or the parter of
the fresh oracle has been revealed, which made the
test query can not work.
According to the rules of the game, we have
¬F4 ∧ ¬F2 → ¬F1,
and
¬F4 → ¬F3.
Let F be the event that B did not abort during the game.
Then, we get
Pr[F ] = Pr[¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 ∧ ¬F3 ∧ ¬F4]
= Pr[¬F2 ∧ ¬F4] ≥
1
q1
· 1
qo
.
Claim 2. Let G be the event that A noticed the inconsis-
tence between the simulation and the real world when B
did not abort the simulation. Then Event G implies that
the probability B solves the (q1-1)-BCAA1 problem is non-
negligible.
Proof: B gives the satisfying response to most of the ora-
cles by following the protocol specification honestly, except
for the one Πtj,u whose private key is ⊥ and the incom-
ing message (M1,M2,M3) is from the tested oracle where
M1 = xP1. Note that the transcripts are one part of the
input to H3 which is modelled as the random oracle to
compute the session keys. If there is some difference be-
tween the reveal query on Πtj,u and a query on H3, it must
have queried H3 with Πtj,u such that
Ktju,1 = ê(M1, dj) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ju,1
= ê(P1, P2)r
t
ju,1 · (ê(P1, P2)
1
h0+s )x.
If A can distinguish the session key Ktju,1 in the simulation
from the real world, then B can return (Kl/ê(P1, P2)r
t
ju,1)
1
x
as the response to the (q1-1)-BCAA1 challenge with prob-
ability 1q1·q0·q3 , where Kl is a random value choosing from
H3 by B. This completes the proof.
Claim 3. Let H be the event that K1 = ê(M1, di) ·
ê(P1, P2)
x
h0+s was not queried on H3 conditioned on ¬G,
then
Pr[¬H] ≥ n(k).
Proof: Similar to the analysis of Cheng and Chen (2007),
we have
Pr[A wins| H] ≤ 1
2
.
Thus
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H]
+ Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
≤ Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[A wins|H]
≤ 1
2
Pr[¬H] + 1
2
and
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H]
+ Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
≥ Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
=
1
2
− 1
2
Pr[¬H]
So we have
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Pr[¬H] ≥ 2|Pr[A wins− 12 ]| = n(k).
Thus, the claim is correct.
Let I be the event that B found the correct Kl. Then
combining all of the above results, we have
Pr[B wins] = Pr[B wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H]
+ Pr[B wins|H] · Pr[H]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q3
n(k) Pr[¬H] + 1
q1 · qo · q3
Pr[H]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q3
n(k),
which contradicts to the hardness of the (q1-1)-BCAA1
problem. This completes the security analysis of the pro-
tocol. 
Remark 6. Since our protocol is proved to be secure in the
security model defined by Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) and
Cheng et al. (2004), it achieves implicit mutual key authen-
tication and the basic security properties, i.e., known ses-
sion key security, key-compromise impersonation resilience
and unknown key-share resilience.
Theorem 2. Our second scheme captures the master key
forward secrecy provided the CDH assumption is sound
and H3 is modelled as random oracle. Specifically, sup-
pose A wins the game with non-negligible advantage n(k),
then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm B to solve
the CDH problem with advantage
AdvCDHB (k) ≥
1
2
n(k).
Proof: According to the protocol specification, the first
item given in Definition 3 is satisfied if A is a benign ad-
versary. We focus on Item 2 in Definition 3 and show how
to construct an algorithm B using the adversary A to solve
a CDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Given a set of pairing parameters and a CDH problem
instance (aP2, bP2), we show how to construct an algo-
rithm B to solve the CDH problem by using A. Algorithm
B simulates the Setup algorithm as follows, B randomly
samples s ∈ Z∗q and computes Ppub = sP1 = ψ(sP2) ∈ G1
which is the master pubic key and uses s as the master key.
The hash function H3 will be modelled as a random oracle
under the control of B, while H1 and H2 will be a crypto-
graphic hash function. Here we need that the master secret
key s is passed to A as well, so B no longer simulates the
Corrupt query.
As in Theorem 1, we use Πsi,j as the s-th oracle among all
the oracles created during the attack. Again algorithm B
answers the following queries which are asked by adversary
A in an arbitrary order.
• H3(IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,Kt2) queries: Algorithm B
maintains an initially empty list H list3 with entries of
the form (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,K
t
2, h
t). B responds
to the query in the following way.
– If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,K
t
2)
is on the list, then B responds with ht.
– Otherwise, B goes through the list Λ which is
maintained in the Reveal query to find a tuple
with values (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,Π
t
i,j) and pro-
ceeds as follows:
∗ Obtain Ti2 and Tj2 from Xt and Y t, respec-
tively. Check if the equality ê(Ti2, Tj2) =
e(P2,Kt2) holds. If the equality holds, then,
· Find the value SKti,j from the list Λ.
· Remove (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,Πti,j)
from the list Λ. Put (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,
Kt1, K
t
2, SK
t
i,j) in the list H
list
3 and
return SKti,j . Note that Π
t
i,j is placed
in the list Λ only when it has been
revealed, so SKti,j has been sampled.
∗ Otherwise (no tuple in Λ meets the test), al-
gorithm B chooses ht ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, in-
serts (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,K
t
2, h
t) into the
list and returns ht.
– Otherwise, B randomly chooses ht ∈ {0, 1}n, in-
serts (IDi, IDj , Xt, Y t,Kt1,K
t
2, h
t) into the list
and returns ht.
Send(Πti,j , (M1,M2,M3)): B maintains a list Ω
for each oracle of the form (Πti,j , tran
t
i,j ,r
t
ij,1, r
t
ij,2,
Ktij,1, SK
t
i,j , c
t
i,j) where tran
t
i,j is the transcript of the
oracle so far; rtij,1, r
t
ij,2, c
t
i,j are used for special pur-
pose explained below, and Ktij,1 and SK
t
i,j are set ⊥
initially. This list is updated in the Send query as well
as in the Reveal query and H3 query. B proceeds in
the following way:
– If (M1,M2,M3) is not the second message on the
transcript,
∗ Randomly sample rtij,1, rtij,2 ∈ Z∗q .
∗ Randomly flip cti,j ∈ {0, 1}.
If cti,j = 0, set Ti1 = r
t
ij,1Qj , Ti2 = r
t
ij,2aP2,
Ti3 = rtij,1H2(Ti2),
else Ti1 = rtij,1Qj , Ti2 = r
t
ij,2bP2, Ti3 =
rtij,1H2(Ti2).
If Ti2 = P2, then responds to the CDH chal-
lenge with 1
rtij,2
bP2 if cti,j = 0, or
1
rtij,2
aP2
otherwise (Event 1).
∗ If (M1,M2,M3) 6= λ, check if the equation
ê(M1, H2(M2)) = ê(Qi,M3) holds or not.
If does not hold, then reject the session;
otherwise, compute
Ktij,1 = ê(M1,
1
s+H1(IDI)
P2)
·ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1
(Note that here the simulator cannot com-
pute Ktij,2 = r
t
ij,2a ·M2 or Ktij,2 = rtij,2b ·M2
because the simulator did not know the value
of a or b) and accept the session.
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∗ Return (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3).
– Otherwise, check if the equation
ê(M1, H2(M2)) = ê(Qi,M3)
holds or not.
If does not hold, then reject the session;
otherwise, compute
Ktij,1 = ê(M1,
1
s+H1(IDI)
P2) · ê(P1, P2)r
t
ij,1
and accept the session.
Reveal(Πti,j): Algorithm B maintains a list Λ with tu-
ples of the form (IDi, IDj , Xi, Yj ,Ktij,1,Π
t
i,j). The al-
gorithm B proceeds in the following way to respond:
– Get the tuple of oracle Πti,j from Ω.
– If Πti,j has not accepted, return ⊥.
– If the Test(Πti,j) query has been issued and if
Πti,j= Π
J
a,b or IDa = IDj and IDb = IDi and
two oracles have the same session ID, then disal-
low the query.
– If SKti,j 6= ⊥, return SKti,j .
– Otherwise,
∗ Go through the list H list3 to find a tu-
ple (IDi, IDj , Ti, Tj ,Ktij,1,K
t
ij,2, h
t) if IDi
is the initiator or a tuple (IDj , IDi,
Tj , Ti,K
t
ij,1,K
t
ij,2, h
t) otherwise. Obtain Ti2
and Tj2 from Ti and Tj , respectively. Check
if the equation ê(Ti2, Tj2) = ê(P2,Kt2) holds
or not, where Ti and Tj are the messages of
party i and j in tranti,j .
∗ If such Zt is found, then return SKti,j = ht.
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample SKti,j ∈
{0, 1}n and put (IDi, IDj , Ti, Tj ,Ktij,1, Πti,j)
if IDi is the initiator or (IDj , IDi,
Tj , Ti,K
t
ij,1,Π
t
i,j) into list Λ. B responds
with SKti,j and puts SK
t
i,j into Ω.
Test(Πti,j): By the rule of the game, there is a partner
oracle Πuj,i with the same session ID with Π
t
i,j and
both should not be revealed. B proceeds as follows:
– Check if cti,j = c
u
j,i. If it is true, then abort the
game (Event 2).
– Otherwise, without loosing generality, we assume
cti,j = 0 and c
u
j,i = 1, i.e., Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3)
where Ti1 = rtij,1Qj , Ti2 = r
t
ij,2aP2, Ti3 =
rtij,1H2(Ti2) and Tj = (Tj1, Tj2, Tj3) where Tj1 =
ruji,1Qi, Tj2 = r
u
ji,2bP2, Tj3 = r
u
ji,1H2(Tj2). B
randomly chooses ζ ∈ {0, 1}n and responds to A
with ζ .
Once A finishes the queries, B proceeds with the fol-
lowing steps:
– For every pair (Xt, Y t,Kt2) on H
list
3 with X
t =
Ti, Y t = Tj if the tested oracle Πti,j is an ini-
tiator oracle, otherwise with Xt = Tj , Y t = Ti,
first obtain Xt2 = Ti2 and Y
t
2 = Tj2 from Ti and
Tj , respectively. Check if ê(Xt2, Y
t
2 ) = ê(P2,K
t
2)
holds (Ti and Tj are found in tranti,j). If no such
Kt2 meets the equation, abort the game (Event
3).
– Otherwise, return 1
rtij,2·ruji,2
Kt2 as the response to
the CDH challenge.
We now analyze the success probability of B. Let
F ′, H′ and I ′ denote Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3,
respectively. Firstly we give two claims.
Claim 4. A did not notice the inconsistence between
the simulation and the real world if B did not abort
the game.
Proof: For most queries, B just correctly answers
by honestly following the protocol specification, thus
the responses to these queries are valid. The mes-
sages of the oracles are uniformly and independently
distributed in the message space as in the real attack.
To H3 queries, by making use of the random oracle
and the pairing as the decisional algorithm of DH, we
can guarantee that the response for every H3 query is
consistent with that of the reveal queries. This claim
follows.
Claim 5.
Pr[¬I ′] ≥ n(k).
This proof is similar to the proof of Claim 3, thus we
omit the detail.
Since
Pr[¬H′] = 1
2
,
we have
Pr[B wins] = Pr[F ′ ∨ (¬H′ ∧ ¬I ′)] ≥ n(k)
2
,
which contradicts to the hardness of the CDH prob-
lem. This completes the security analysis of the pro-
tocol. 
Remark 7. According to the definition of the forward se-
crecy, if a protocol satisfies with master key forward se-
crecy, then it must hold perfect forward secrecy. So we
can claim that our protocol satisfies with perfect forward
secrecy and master key forward secrecy.
Combined with theorem 1 and theorem 2, we draw a
conclusion that the second scheme satisfies all kinds of
basic security attributes, i.e., known session key security,
forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience
and unknown key-share resilience, where forward secrecy
consists of partial forward secrecy, perfect forward secrecy
and master key forward secrecy.
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7 Conclusion
We proposed two identity-based key agreement protocols
and showed that these protocols hold stronger security
compared to the MB protocols. Our protocols meet all
security requirements, including the master key forward
secrecy. We firstly presented a security model with mas-
ter key forward secrecy. We then analyzed Xie’s protocol
to show that signature is undesirable for an identify-based
key agreement protocol with master key forward secrecy.
We presented two enhanced indentity-based authenticated
key agreement protocols inspired from MB-2 by adding an
extra DH key to obtain the master key forward secrecy. We
proved the security of our protocols, under a gap assump-
tion and a computational assumption, respectively. The
master key forward secrecy can be reduced to the compu-
tational Diffie Hellman assumption using the new security
model we defined. The efficiency of the first scheme is com-
parable to the original MB protocol in terms of the pairing
computation. Although the second scheme is less efficient
than the first one, it achieves the strongest security.
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A B
x ∈R Z∗q y ∈R Z∗q
AKA = xQB , BKA = yQA,
SA = H2(AKA)dA + xdA SB = H2(BKA)dB + ydB
(AKA,SA)−−−−−−−−−→
(BKA,SB)←−−−−−−−−−
KAB = ê(BKA, dA)x KBA = ê(AKA, dB)y
Figure 1: Xie’s modified protocol with signature.
A B
x1, x2 ∈R Z∗q y1, y2 ∈R Z∗q
T11 = x1QB , T21 = y1QA,
T12 = x2P2 T22 = y2P2
T1=T11‖T12−−−−−−−−−→
T2=T21‖T22←−−−−−−−−−
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1 KBA1 = ê(T11, dB) · ê(P1, P2)y1
KAB2 = x2 · T22 KBA2 = y2 · T12
skA = H2(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖KAB1‖KAB2) skB = H2(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖KBA1‖KBA2)
Figure 2: The first protocol.
A B
x1, x2 ∈R Z∗q y1, y2 ∈R Z∗q
T11 = x1QB , T21 = y1QA,
T12 = x2P2, T22 = y2P2,
T13 = x1H2(x2P2) T23 = y1H2(y2P2)
T1=(T11,T12,T13)−−−−−−→
T2=(T21,T22,T23)←−−−−−−
check ê(T21, H2(T22)) = ê(QA, T23) check ê(T11, H2(T12)) = ê(QB , T13)
KAB1 = ê(T21, dA) · ê(P1, P2)x1 KBA1 = ê(T11, dB) · ê(P1, P2)y1
KAB2 = x2 · T22 KBA2 = y2 · T12
skA = H3(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖KAB1‖KAB2) skB = H3(A‖B‖T1‖T2‖KBA1‖KBA2)
Figure 3: The second protocol with strengthening security.
Schemes Security Properties Reduction Performance
k-ks fs kci uks
s d m
MB-1 McCullagh and Barreto (2005) - X X × × - - P + 3M
MB-2 McCullagh and Barreto (2005) X X × × X X k-GBCAA1 P + 2M + E
MB-1+2 X X X × X X k-GBCAA1 P + 2M + 2E
e-MB Chen et al. (2007) X X × × X X k-BCAA1 3P + 3M + E
Ours1 X X X X X X k-GBCAA1+CDH P + 4M + E
Ours2 X X X X X X k-BCAA1+CDH 3P + 5M + E
Table 1: Comparison of the identity-based key agreement schemes in the literature. Ours1 and Ours2 denote our first
scheme and second scheme respectively.
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